When Wish became a global meme

For a few years, Wish defined how Western consumers experienced Chinese e-commerce. The platform became a meme, a shopping app and a global marketplace at the same time — reaching more than 100 million monthly users and shipping products to over 100 countries.

Then, almost as quickly as it had risen, it disappeared. And as Wish was fading from the spotlight, a new platform emerged that looked strikingly familiar: Temu.

• Same pricing logic.
• Same supply chains.
• Same aggressive marketing.

But while Wish collapsed, Temu scaled. Somewhere along the way, their trajectories diverged. But where?

The rise — and quiet disappearance — of Wish

Wish was founded in 2010 by Piotr Szulczewski and Danny Zhang and operated by the San-Francisco-based company ContextLogic, the technology company behind the marketplace.

Szulczewski, a former Google engineer, designed Wish not as a traditional online shop, but as a mobile discovery platform. Instead of searching for products, users scrolled through an endless feed of algorithmically recommended items — an experience closer to social media than to classic e-commerce.

Behind this interface sat a large cross-border marketplace connecting Western consumers directly with merchants, most of whom were based in China. This structure enabled extremely low prices and rapid assortment expansion.

For a time, the model scaled: According to ContextLogic’s SEC filings around the company’s 2020 IPO, Wish reached more than 100 million monthly active users globally and operated in over 100 countries.

But the decline came quickly. User numbers dropped from over 100 million to roughly 74 million within a short period after the IPO, according to subsequent ContextLogic filings. As marketing spend was reduced, traffic followed. What initially looked like massive scale proved to be fragile.

In 2024, ContextLogic exited the business entirely, selling the Wish marketplace to Singapore-based e-commerce group Qoo10 for approximately $173 million, as reported in the company’s 2024 annual disclosures.

Today, Wish still exists under Qoo10 ownership — but at a dramatically smaller scale. According to ECDB projections, the platform’s GMV may reach around €43 million by 2026, a fraction of what its early trajectory once suggested.

The question is why such a large platform lost relevance so quickly.

The cracks in the model

Several structural weaknesses of the Wish model became visible over time.

Dependence on paid growth
Wish invested heavily in digital advertising to drive app installs and traffic. When marketing spend declined, user numbers dropped almost immediately. The platform struggled to convert initial attention into sustained engagement.

Erosion of trust
The meme culture surrounding Wish reflected a deeper issue: inconsistent product quality, misleading listings and long delivery times. The humor generated visibility — but also defined the brand.

A fragile logistics model
Wish relied heavily on direct cross-border shipping from Chinese merchants to Western consumers. This resulted in long delivery times and complex returns. While the company attempted to improve logistics, the model remained fundamentally cross-border.

More importantly, this approach would have struggled under today’s conditions. Rising tariffs, stricter customs enforcement and geopolitical tensions have made ultra-cheap cross-border shipping significantly more complex — putting pressure on exactly the structure Wish depended on.

Limited marketplace evolution
Wish never developed into a broader marketplace ecosystem. Initiatives such as Wish Local were discontinued, and the platform struggled to attract a meaningful base of international sellers. The merchant structure remained largely China-centric, limiting its ability to evolve into a more resilient global marketplace.

By the time the company attempted to address these issues, momentum was already lost.

Temu — another marketplace as “bought on Wish”?

When Temu entered Western markets, the similarities were hard to ignore. The platform combined three core elements that had already defined Wish:

• extremely aggressive marketing
• ultra-low prices
• direct manufacturer access.

Both platforms connected Western consumers directly with Chinese supply chains. Both scaled through visibility. And both positioned themselves around price. Yet Temu did not simply repeat the model — it extended it. The platform has already reached more than 75 million monthly users in the EU, qualifying as a Very Large Online Platform under the Digital Services Act, according to the European Commission.

Where Temu corrected Wish’s weaknesses

Temu entered the market with a model that looked similar to Wish — but addressed the same structural challenges more systematically.

From attention loops to retention systems
Wish relied on behavioral triggers such as endless scrolling and flash deals to drive impulse purchases. These mechanisms optimized for attention. Temu builds on this logic with more explicit gamification systems — including rewards, incentives and repeat-visit triggers — designed to increase retention and frequency.

From unmanaged inconsistency to controlled risk
Both platforms struggle with trust. But while Wish let merchants handle customer complaints with widely different outcomes, Temu manages them more systematically through centralized policies, refund mechanisms and tighter platform control. The problems remain — but are less visible to the customer.

From cross-border dependence to hybrid fulfillment
Wish remained fundamentally dependent on direct China-to-consumer shipping. Temu, by contrast, is actively transitioning toward hybrid fulfillment models that combine cross-border supply with regional warehousing and local inventory.

This shift is partly strategic and partly reactive. Rising tariffs and stricter trade controls have made pure cross-border models harder to sustain. Temu has responded by building infrastructure that Wish never developed.

From a China-centric seller base to a gradually global marketplace
While both platforms started with a heavy focus on China-based merchants, Temu managed to evolve from that and is actively expanding its seller base to include European and American merchants. This transition is still ongoing — but marks a clear strategic shift. 

The difference in scale reflects this evolution. ECDB data highlights the scale of this divergence: Temu could reach around €110.6 billion in GMV by 2026, while Wish is expected to remain at roughly €43 million.

A divergence that reshaped the China marketplace narrative

After all, Wish and Temu did not quite represent the same marketplace model. Wish built a viral discovery app that connected Western consumers with Chinese merchants — but failed to build the infrastructure required for long-term growth. 

Temu started from a similar foundation, but evolved into a much more complex global platform. The difference lies less in pricing than in execution and evolution. While Wish mostly stayed true to its nature, Temu simply managed to adapt.

But it is also important to consider the historical context when comparing the two. Because Temu is not just executing better — it is also operating under conditions that force a more mature version of the same model. Conditions that Wish did not experience during their prime. 

The result remains: in global marketplaces, scale alone is not enough. Infrastructure decides who survives.

Key Learnings

1. Viral growth does not guarantee platform stability
2. Logistics is becoming a structural advantage
3. Marketplace success depends on seller diversity
4. Trust is not solved — it is managed
5. Execution matters more than the model

Enjoyed this article? The Marketplace Universe Weekly is our free newsletter — every Monday, the latest marketplace news, platform updates, our newest posts, and the insights that matter, delivered straight to your inbox. So you never miss a thing.
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25.03.2026 – Written by Ricarda Eichler, Journalist and Author for OHN

Der Beitrag From Meme to Market Leader: Why Wish collapsed while Temu exploded erschien zuerst auf Marketplace Universe.

From electronics stall to ecommerce giant

JD.com’s origins are far more operational than mythical. Liu Qiangdong, who commonly goes by Richard Liu, founded JD.com in 1998 as a small electronics retail business in Beijing. The company entered ecommerce in the early 2000s, pivoting aggressively after the SARS outbreak accelerated online shopping in China.

The name “JD” is short for Jingdong (京东). While the abbreviation has since become a global brand, its roots remain deeply practical: selling electronics reliably, at scale and with minimal intermediaries.

From the outset, JD differentiated itself not through openness, but through control — over inventory, pricing, logistics, and customer experience. That decision still defines the company today.

JD’s company structure and ecosystem

JD.com Group operates as a multi-layered commerce and logistics organization, with JD Retail at its core-

• JD Retail
  The core business unit overseeing first-party retail. JD Retail buys inventory directly and sells it to end customers, complemented by a selectively managed third-party marketplace.
• JD Marketplace (3P)
  The marketplace unit functions as a division of JD Retail. It allows selected third-party sellers to use the platform — however, this model is primarily used domestically.
• JD Logistics
  A separately listed logistics arm that operates warehouses, fulfilment centres, and last-mile delivery.

Can I sell my products on the JD Marketplace outside China?

Yes — but in a very limited and controlled way.

JD’s open third-party marketplace operates mostly in mainland China. Outside China, JD does not run a broad, open seller marketplace comparable to Amazon Marketplace or AliExpress. Instead:

• In Asia, JD supports cross-border and regional retail initiatives.
• In Western markets, JD focuses on:
  • first-party retail,
  • curated partnerships,
  • and experimental platforms like Joybuy.

This means that for most Western brands, “selling on JD” does not equal self-serve marketplace access.

JD’s European ambitions and the Ceconomy acquisition

JD’s interest in Europe became tangible through its move to acquire a stake in Ceconomy, the parent company of MediaMarkt and Saturn — Europe’s largest consumer electronics retail group.

Strategically, the acquisition would give JD:

• immediate access to Europe’s electronics-heavy customer base,
• physical retail infrastructure,
• and deep category alignment with JD’s historical strengths.

However, the deal remains under regulatory review. European competition authorities are assessing its potential impact on market concentration in consumer electronics, supplier access and pricing dynamics, as well as data usage and logistics integration.

Until these concerns are resolved, the acquisition remains strategically significant but operationally constrained.

What JD.com actually sells (and in what proportions)

JD’s assortment to this day strongly reflects its origins, as is underlined by ECDB data:

• Electronics & appliances: ~45–50% of total GMV
  Smartphones, computers, TVs, and large appliances dominate JD’s revenue base.
• Home, FMCG & groceries: ~20–25%
  A fast-growing segment supported by JD’s logistics capabilities.
• Fashion & lifestyle: ~10–15%
  Important, but not central to JD’s positioning.
• Health, beauty & personal care: high-growth, single-digit share
  Often sold directly by JD or through authorized partners.

What about Joybuy?

Joybuy is JD.com’s international-facing retail and marketplace brand, designed to test JD’s model outside its core Chinese market. Within the wider JD Group, it remains a comparatively small initiative, operating at a fraction of the scale of the company’s domestic retail business and clearly positioned as an experimental extension rather than a core growth engine.

In Europe, Joybuy’s history has been uneven. Earlier expansion efforts across multiple countries were later scaled back after limited traction, leading JD to shut down or pause Joybuy operations in most markets. Only within the United Kingdom, Joybuy was able to really establish itself with a localized online store with JD-managed assortment and fulfilment. In Germany, JD briefly experimented with the brand Ochama and omnichannel concepts before consolidating its international retail presence under the Joybuy name again.

Who shops on JD.com

JD’s customer base skews toward urban, higher-income, and trust-oriented shoppers. These consumers often make higher-consideration purchases — electronics, appliances, and branded goods — where reliability matters more than rock-bottom pricing.

Marketplace Universe Insight:
JD.com is not chasing maximum shopper reach. It is deliberately optimizing for trust, reliability, and high-consideration purchases, reinforcing a consumer perception closer to a premium retailer than a bargain marketplace.

Where JD’s money really comes from

ECDB data places JD.com among the top global ecommerce players by GMV:

Crucially, less than 10% of JD’s GMV is generated outside China. JD is global in ambition, but still overwhelmingly domestic in revenue.

JD vs the big marketplaces: a structural comparison

Key difference:
JD optimizes for control, Amazon for global customer obsession, Alibaba for ecosystem scale

What it really means to sell through JD.com

Joining JD does not usually mean listing products directly.

For most brands — especially outside China — JD operates as a retail partner:

• JD buys inventory from brands or authorized distributors.
• JD controls pricing, fulfilment, and customer service.
• Brands gain access to JD’s customer base without operating day-to-day marketplace logistics.

This model reduces brand control but increases trust, consistency, and operational simplicity.

Marketplace Universe Insight:
JD.com is not chasing maximum shopper reach. It is deliberately optimizing for trust, reliability, and high-consideration purchases, reinforcing a consumer perception closer to a premium retailer than a bargain marketplace.

Logistics as a competitive weapon

Logistics is JD’s defining capability. Rather than outsourcing fulfilment, JD built a nationwide infrastructure of warehouses, sorting centers, and last-mile delivery operations. This enables same-day or next-day delivery across large parts of China.

Internationally, JD relies more on regional fulfilment hubs and partners, but its logistics mindset remains consistent: speed, predictability, and ownership over critical steps.

Trust, compliance, and brand protection

JD’s retail-led structure changes the trust equation fundamentally. By purchasing inventory directly, JD minimizes risks related to counterfeits, inconsistent quality, and unauthorized sellers. Compliance, invoicing, and customer service are centralized, reducing friction for consumers — and raising the bar for brand participation.

This approach creates fewer seller opportunities, but stronger consumer confidence.

Key learnings

• JD.com is a retailer first, marketplace second
• Electronics and appliances remain its economic backbone
• International GMV is still below 10%
• Joybuy is strategic, not intended for core revenue
• Seller access is curated, not open
• Logistics ownership underpins JD’s trust advantage
• Europe matters — but regulation slows expansion

Enjoyed this article? The Marketplace Universe Weekly is our free newsletter — every Monday, the latest marketplace news, platform updates, our newest posts, and the insights that matter, delivered straight to your inbox. So you never miss a thing.
Subscribe here: https://marketplace-universe.com/newsletter/

08.01.2026 – Written by Ricarda Eichler, Journalist and Author for OHN

Der Beitrag JD.com: Built for Control, Not Scale erschien zuerst auf Marketplace Universe.

In a nutshell

AliExpress Europe is gaining strong momentum, evolving from a low-cost export site into a localized marketplace with EU warehouses and faster delivery. This article highlights the platform’s strongest markets by GMV and user reach, its top-selling categories, and how shopper behavior is changing across the continent. It also examines what this means for European brands and retailers — and whether AliExpress Europe is a chance or a challenge for them.
Time to Read: appr. 7 min

AliExpress in Europe: From Bargain Basement to Billion-Dollar Player

Once dismissed as a marketplace for cheap gadgets and fakes, AliExpress has quietly become one of Europe’s fastest-growing shopping platforms.
In 2025, the Alibaba-owned giant reached top marketplace rankings in Spain, France, and Portugal, with very high usage in several countries — especially across Southern Europe.

Behind this rise is a simple formula: low prices, faster delivery, and a new generation of value-driven shoppers who no longer care where a parcel ships from — as long as it’s affordable, traceable, and arrives quickly.

So what’s fueling AliExpress Europe’s momentum — and what should brands and retailers make of it?

From Factory Floors to European Doorsteps

Launched in 2010 as an offshoot of Alibaba’s B2B platform, AliExpress began as a cross-border export channel for Chinese manufacturers.
For much of the 2010s, its presence in Western markets was marginal, with activity concentrated in Russia, Brazil, and Eastern Europe.

That changed around 2018, when Alibaba invested heavily in European localization:

• Country sites in Spain, France, and Italy
• EU-based logistics via Cainiao
• Partnerships with influencers and local marketing pushes

Since 2022, those investments have paid off. AliExpress has climbed into top marketplace rankings in multiple European markets, combining factory-direct prices with EU delivery times.

Marketplace Universe Insight:
What started as a global outlet for Chinese factories has evolved into a localized retail channel — fast, flexible, and increasingly European in logistics and presentation.

What Europeans Buy on AliExpress

AliExpress’s strengths haven’t changed: it’s built for volume, variety, and value.
The best-performing categories remain those that travel easily cross-border and appeal to impulse buyers.

Top categories on AliExpress Europe:

• Apparel, fast fashion, and accessories
• Small consumer electronics and phone gear
• Home & kitchen gadgets, décor, and DIY tools
• Beauty accessories and low-cost cosmetics
• Toys, hobby products, and seasonal novelties

Because of the platform’s low-price orientation, listings are dominated by trend-led, commodity-style SKUs rather than premium branded products.
Yet the rise of official brand stores and EU-stock sellers signals a gradual shift toward more trust and consistency.

Who Shops on AliExpress — and Why It Matters

AliExpress attracts a price-sensitive but diverse audience. The platform’s transparency reports under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) provide rare visibility into its European reach. See the full analysis of the EU Transparency reports for AliExpress, Shein, Temu and TikTok here!

By the numbers (HY1 2025):

• Spain: 72.5 % penetration
• Romania: 59.8 %
• Portugal: 50.1 %
• Lithuania: 129.5 % (multi-device usage likely)

Big markets by audience:
France (33.5 M users), Spain (35.6 M), Germany (25.8 M), Italy (19.7 M), Poland (14.7 M)

Fastest-growing markets:
Lithuania (+147.7 % YoY), Austria (+83.9 %), Czechia (+82.5 %), Sweden (+75.7 %), Romania (+60.1 %)

AliExpress Europe has moved beyond bargain hunters. The platform is winning mainstream users — including mobile-first, middle-income shoppers in Western Europe.

Where the Money Flows

AliExpress is no longer a marginal player. According to ECDB.com, its global GMV reached $639.3 B in 2024, up 33.5 % year-on-year, driven entirely by third-party sellers. That’s nearly 100× growth since 2014.

Top European markets by GMV (2024):

• France – $4.65 B (7.3 %)
• Spain – $3.99 B (6.3 %)
• Germany – $2.97 B (4.6 %)
• United Kingdom – $2.75 B (4.3 %)
• Italy – $2.60 B (4.1 %)

Other notable markets: Netherlands ($1.81 B), Portugal ($0.66 B), Poland ($1.39 B), Czechia ($0.40 B), Hungary ($0.37 B)

Category breakdown:

• Fashion: $19.8 B (31 %)
• Electronics: $13.3 B (21 %)
• DIY & Tools: $13.6 B
• Homeware & Leisure: $16.7 B
• Smaller segments: Groceries ($3.8 B), Personal Care ($2.0 B), Toys ($2.9 B)

Globally, Europe accounts for roughly 25–30 % of AliExpress GMV, making it a critical growth region behind China, the U.S. ($9.63 B), and South Korea ($6.85 B).

Marketplace Universe Insight:
The numbers are real — but so is the competition. To win on AliExpress Europe, brands need price discipline, fast delivery, and localized content.

How to Sell on AliExpress Europe

AliExpress remains one of the most accessible marketplaces for global sellers — but accessibility also means saturation.
To stand out, brands need to master both cost control and content localization.

Seller Landscape

• Individual sellers: Small merchants and entrepreneurs targeting global buyers
• Established brands: Increasingly using AliExpress to test new markets

Fees

• Commission: 5–8 %, depending on category
• Annual platform fee: $130–$1,300, depending on category
• Listing fees: None

Fulfillment

• Cainiao Network: Alibaba’s logistics backbone, offering AliExpress Standard Shipping and Cainiao Super Economy.
• Local+ Program (since 2025): Enables EU-based fulfillment from warehouses in Spain, France, Germany, Poland, and the UK, marked by a Local+ badge for faster delivery and returns.

Marketplace Universe Insight:
For European sellers, Local+ can be the difference between being seen as “cheap” or “trusted.” Faster delivery and local returns drive repeat purchases and better reviews.

Compliance, IP, and Customer Trust

Tax & VAT Compliance

Since July 2021, AliExpress applies the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) system for EU orders under €150 — collecting and remitting VAT directly.
For higher-value shipments, VAT and customs are handled at import.

Outside the EU, local tax rules apply (e.g., U.S. state sales taxes). Sellers must ensure compliance across all jurisdictions.

Intellectual Property Protection

AliExpress runs an IP Protection (IPP) platform where brands can register trademarks and report counterfeit listings.
However, enforcement gaps remain: the European Commission has criticized AliExpress for failing to fully prevent unsafe and counterfeit products.

Consumer Trust

Despite improvements in buyer protection and VAT handling, reputation remains AliExpress’s weak spot.
Frequent issues include delayed shipping, inconsistent product quality, and safety concerns.

To rebuild confidence, AliExpress offers:

• Buyer Protection Program: Refunds for undelivered or misrepresented items
• Escrow Payments: Funds released only after buyer confirmation
• Transparent Seller Ratings: Public reviews and order histories

Marketplace Universe Insight:
AliExpress Europe is walking a tightrope — balancing scale with trust. Its biggest challenge now isn’t logistics, but perception.

Should Retailers and Brands Pay Attention?

A tentative Yes — but selectively!
AliExpress Europe offers huge volume potential, yet not every brand will thrive there.

It’s an attractive channel for:

• Fast-fashion brands looking to expand their D2C reach
• Accessory, electronics, or DIY sellers with strong price competitiveness
• Value-driven categories with low returns and high SKU rotation

For premium or niche brands, the platform can serve as a market test lab — but reputation and pricing must be carefully managed.

Conclusion

AliExpress is no longer just “that cheap Chinese site.”
It’s now a serious European marketplace, blending low-cost sourcing with local logistics and billions in GMV.
For brands, the question isn’t if it matters — but how to use it strategically without compromising quality or trust.

28.10.2025 – Written by Ricarda Eichler and Ingrid Lommer

Der Beitrag The Rise of ALiExpress Europe erschien zuerst auf Marketplace Universe.

Western Brands Unknowingly Flood Shein: A New FrontieR in Unauthorized Sales

by Ingrid Lommer

Western luxury and sports brands are facing an unexpected dilemma as their products appear on Shein, the fast-fashion giant known for low prices and questionable sourcing. The likes of Adidas, Puma, Nike, Ray-Ban, and Calvin Klein are being sold on the Chinese platform—at deep discounts and with shoddy product listings—without the brands’ consent. With the platform expanding its reach across Europe, from Germany to the UK, the question of where these products come from and how they end up on Shein is becoming more pressing.

A Surge of Branded Goods on Shein’s Marketplace

In recent weeks, items from Adidas and Puma have been spotted on Shein’s European sites, selling at prices far below what shoppers would find on official brand stores or authorized retailers. The Adidas Samba sneaker, for instance, is available for as little as €62.29 on Shein Germany, while the same model retails for €120 on Adidas’s own site. And this is just the beginning.

Puma, alarmed by these developments, has hinted at potential legal action, while Adidas has issued a public statement clarifying that it does not permit its products to be sold on Shein. Despite this, Shein’s marketplace continues to offer these brands, and it’s not just in Germany—Shein Switzerland, France, Spain, Italy, and the UK are all showing similar trends.

Digging Deeper: Our Investigation into Shein Germany and Switzerland

At Marketplace Universe, we took a closer look at Shein’s German and Swiss platforms to understand the scale and variety of the branded products being sold. The results were revealing—and troubling. In Germany, the listings are scattered and inconsistent. High-end brands like Swarovski appear, but with poorly rendered product images and incomplete descriptions, making it hard to determine authenticity or product quality. The Adidas Samba, for example, is misnamed as “Adidas Classic Boots,” a title that does nothing to assure buyers of its authenticity. Similarly, Ray-Ban sunglasses are sold by a third-party vendor with minimal transparency about who is behind the listing.

In Switzerland, things get even more interesting. The Adidas section here is larger, featuring items like the Argentina national soccer jersey, though some items bear labels indicating Chinese origins, raising red flags about potential gray market involvement. Nike products, sold under the guise of third-party stores like “Sports Pavilion,” seem to follow a similar pattern, with customer reviews confirming that these items are likely sourced outside official European channels. Yet, none of these products reflect the latest seasonal offerings. Instead, they tend to be basic, evergreen models that never go out of stock, reinforcing the notion that Shein may be scooping up overstock or excess inventory.

Shein’s Expanding Reach Across Europe

Our research into Shein’s platforms in France and the UK revealed a large presence of Western-branded accessories. On Shein UK, we found 27 Michael Kors bags, all heavily discounted, with price reductions of up to 69%. This suggests a significant influx of luxury goods at prices far below their typical retail cost. Meanwhile, on Shein France, the accessory brand Coach was widely available, with several hundred Coach products listed, offering a broad selection of bags, wallets, and other items.

Despite the sizable assortment of luxury accessories, the overall trend on Shein remains the same: poor product descriptions, vague or minimal details, and inconsistent presentation. Whether browsing high-end bags in the UK or Coach accessories in France, the listings often lack the quality you’d expect from these renowned brands, and many products seem to be part of discounted or fragmented collections rather than current-season stock.

Where Is Shein Getting These Products?

The big question remains: how did these branded goods find their way onto Shein in the first place? The brands themselves are certainly not selling directly to the platform, but that leaves several possible avenues for how these products are sourced.

One likely explanation is overstock. Fashion is a highly seasonal business, and out-of-season products often end up being sold off to secondary markets in bulk. The items available on Shein tend to be classic, “never out of stock” pieces—think of the iconic Adidas Samba, not a limited-edition or seasonal design. These overproduced items are often sold at a steep discount to international buyers.

Another possible source is the gray market. When products are sold in large quantities, especially through wholesalers, they sometimes “disappear” into unofficial distribution channels. In some cases, retailers or distributors sell excess inventory to foreign markets, where the products may eventually end up on Shein through resellers.

There’s also the possibility of B-goods or outlet-grade products—those that don’t meet the brand’s standard for full-price sale but are still authentic. These are sometimes made in bulk specifically for outlets or discount retailers, offering an explanation for the lower prices and varying quality found on Shein. Lastly, Shein’s marketplace model, which allows third-party sellers to offer branded goods, may be the key. It’s possible that authorized distributors of Adidas, Puma, and other brands are reselling stock through Shein, or that Shein is sourcing from resellers in markets like Asia or Eastern Europe.

What can Brands do?

The question of how Shein is sourcing these products is likely to have many answers, each one reflecting the complexities of today’s global supply chain. Our research into Shein Germany and Switzerland suggests that Shein’s stock is a mix of overstock, gray market goods, and items likely bought from third-party distributors. The products on Shein are rarely current-season, and they’re often heavily discounted and fragmented, like something you’d find in an outlet store rather than a full retail collection.

What’s particularly striking is how inconsistent the listings are across countries. Shein Switzerland, France and Spain, for example, features a much wider range of fashion, accessories and sportswear than Shein Germany, suggesting that some countries may be easier entry points for unauthorized goods. Meanwhile, Shein Germany is dominated by jewelry and beauty products, with less of a focus on fashion and sportswear.

For brands, the first step in solving this problem is to start buying their products directly from Shein and tracking the packaging, labels, and batch numbers to trace where these goods originated. A systematic sweep of Shein’s various marketplaces in different countries is also essential to get a full picture of how widespread this issue is. Ultimately, brands face a growing challenge: Shein is here to stay, and its marketplace model shows no signs of slowing down. The platform’s sheer scale and ability to sell these products cheaply makes it an attractive option for consumers—but a potential nightmare for brands trying to protect their image and control their distribution. And what is currently happening on Shein is likely to be a foretaste of future developments on Temu. After all, this platform is also transforming into a marketplace – which opens new doors for the gray market.

Der Beitrag Western Brands on Shein erschien zuerst auf Marketplace Universe.

Temu invites EU sellers to marketplace

This has been a long time coming: In March, Temu first invited sellers to their US platform, moving slightly away from their factory-to-consumer model to tentativley open towards a more traditional marketplace model. From then on, US based sellers can list their products on Temu, sending orders from their own warehouses. Now, Temu has brought this new approach to Europe.

This week, Zixia Yi, who according to her LinkedIn profile is responsible for Temu’s seller acquisition in the EU market, posted:

“As of July, the [Temu] marketplace is officially open for registration for businesses with EU entities, including those based in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands.”

So, from now on sellers based in Europe can list their products on everybody’s least favorite retail nemessis. They are responsible for product listing, warehousing, logistics and returns; Temu, on the other hand, will handle for product pricing (whereby the seller is apparently allowed to set at least a base price), customer service and marketing, both on and off-site.

Conditions for selling on Temu

The costs? 0 – at least according to information provided by Zixia Yi. At the moment, there is “no entry fee, no commission, no advertising fee and no monthly fee” she told Marketplace Universe. Several retailers report from their own talks with Temu, that these conditions are supposedly fixed for the foreseeable future. Temu’s business model: The sellers set a fixed minimum price (which is matched with their lowest price on Amazon), while Temu handles the pricing on the platform. If the item is sold for a higher, Temu keeps the difference to the minimum price.

To sell on Temu, companies have to be registered in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands or UK. And they need a local VAT ID for the EU country they wish to sell to. At the moment, the process for selling is invite-only: Interested seller have to contact Zixia Yi. If they get Temu’s approval, selling can begin within a few days.

Temu’s goals in Europe? Look at the US market

Temu’s new offer is not surprising. In March, the platform opened up to sellers based in the USA. Since then, the proportion of locally shipped orders in the USA has risen sharply: 20 percent of Temu’s US sales are now being generated via local department stores, according to a recent report in the US business magazine The Information. However, these sales have so far been made almost exclusively by Chinese companies with a US branch, according to Marketplace Pulse – and virtually no American retailers.

If you take the US market as a blueprint for Temu’s goals in the EU, opening up to the classic marketplace (and thus a partial departure from the revolutionary factory-to-consumer principle?) seems to be more about speeding up delivery and passing on logistics costs to retail partners than about expanding (or improving the quality of) the product range. On the American Temu app – under the label “Local warehouse” – you will find mostly the same or comparable products as the suppliers from China; only the delivery time is longer and the prices are usually slightly higher.

A quick scroll through the German Temu app shows the same pattern: There are several offers with the new “local warehouse” label, e.g. from the Chinese electronics sellers KXD Direct and QDDQ, both of which also sell their products via FBA on Amazon. Incidentally, an identical tablet from QDDQ costs 129.99 on Amazon and 83.59 on Temu, both of which can be delivered within 3 days.

Who will take up Temu’s offer?

It almost sounds as if the classic Chinese import crate-pusher retailers, which were already almost dead on Amazon, are getting a second chance here… But will there be much for them to earn on the low-cost platform if they don’t push the Chinese manufacturers even harder on price than Temu already does?

The offer will still find willing participants, says Austrian retail expert Markus Miklautsch who discovered Yi’s post on LinkedIn first: “The fact that Temu is now looking for a direct route to producers and retailers in the EU, and is communicating this publicly shows us how quickly we have to react. In my opinion, producers from Europe will also use this marketplace to sell to customers in the long or short term. Of course, this will also change the trade. Of course, we know that many customers don’t buy there. But we can no longer rest on our laurels, because our advantages are diminishing.”

Der Beitrag Temu Opens Marketplace for EU sellers erschien zuerst auf Marketplace Universe.